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We conducted 2 experiments on the framing effect; recording reaction times in the first using 
a questionnaire and in the second using a computer-programmed procedure. We found that 
a positive framing effect caused participants to make faster decisions and show an intuitive, 
heuristic, decision-making pattern; whereas a negative framing effect caused participants to 
make slower decisions and show a rational, analytical, decision-making pattern. These results 
suggest that when decision-making time is not strictly controlled, other potential factors such 
as individual and cultural differences may influence the robustness of the framing effect.
Keywords: cognitive processing, framing effect, robustness, decision making, information 
processing.
The framing effect has been a major topic of research in the psychology of 
judgment and decision making. The framing effect refers to the phenomenon that 
equivalent descriptions of a decision problem lead to different choices, depending 
on whether or not the choice is presented as a loss or as a gain (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981). Many researchers have shown that the framing effect is 
reliable, although overall effect sizes vary among research findings according 
to differences in design including manipulations of reference points, outcome 
salience, and response mode (choice vs. rating/judgment; Kühberger, 1998). A 
detailed description of the context (Bless, Betsch, & Franzen, 1998; LeBoeuf 
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& Shafir, 2003) also affects the outcome of the framing effect. Kahneman and 
Tversky (1982) argued that the framing effect may be related to individuals’ 
information-processing styles. Dunegan (1993) found that participants who 
receive negative framing information show more analytical (rational analysis and 
reasoning) traits, whereas those who receive positive framing information show 
more heuristic (intuitive response) traits. The dual-systems model (Gilovich, 
Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Stanovich & West, 
2000) is based on the premise that individuals have two systems for decision 
making – a heuristic system based on intuition and an analytic system based on 
reason – and that different framing conditions may activate different cognitive 
systems. 
Although many researchers have shown the existence of the framing effect 
(Fagley & Miller, 1990; Kühberger, 1998), results have been inconsistent. 
That is, sometimes decision makers take risks under both positive and negative 
framing conditions, with riskier choices made under negative framing conditions, 
which has been termed a preference shift (Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998). 
Researchers conducting studies with Chinese populations have found that 
participants are prone to take risks under both positive and negative framing 
conditions (Li, 2003; Wang, 1996). For instance, Zhang and Miao (2008) found 
that Chinese participants make risky decisions under both types of framing 
circumstances, with the number of lives concerned being expressed during the 
decision-making process as a social clue for their choices. Also, compared with 
large-group situations, participants in small-group situations take more risks.
In contrast to studies with Western participants, in which robust framing effects 
have been found, in studies with Chinese participants less frequent framing 
effects have been shown. Wang, Simons, and Brédart (2001) suggested that 
varying cultural backgrounds might contribute to such differences. Moreover, in 
most previous research, participants were not given time restrictions when they 
were asked to fill out questionnaires. This methodology provides participants 
with time for thorough consideration and, thus, makes it difficult to control 
other potential factors that might influence decision making. Wang et al. (2001) 
pointed out that although the framing effect influences one’s decision making, its 
influence is much weaker than that of other factors such as social background, 
individual experiences, and personal traits. Allowing participants unlimited time 
for free thinking could result in other factors, such as social cues or individual 
experiences, influencing decision making, therefore leading to variable framing 
effects. 
In the current study, we compared participants’ decision making in time-un-
controlled and time-controlled conditions. In the latter condition, materials were 
presented on computers so that the procedure was subject to temporal control, 
THE FRAMING EFFECT IN COGNITIVE PROCESSING 39
thus reducing the effects of other factors such as social cues and individual 
experiences. By analyzing participants’ decision-making times, we were able to 
make inferences about information processing under different framing conditions. 
Our results in this study shed light on why framing effects are variable in many 
studies with Chinese participants. 
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 was conducted using a questionnaire with no time limit, to 
replicate previous classic methods in research on framing effects.
Method
Participants and Procedure. Participants were 234 Chinese college students 
recruited from a variety of departments within a university in Beijing, China. Of 
these participants, 119 were assigned to the positive framing group (61 males, 
58 females), and 115 were assigned to the negative framing group (57 males, 58 
females). 
We adopted Tversky and Kahneman’s (1981) classical framing “Asian 
disease” problem1. For both positive and negative framing groups, Plan A was 
the less risky choice, and Plan B was the more risky choice (see Tables 1 and 
2). Participants completed the Asian disease problem during regularly scheduled 
laboratory classes, and no time restrictions were imposed.
Results
The results of the questionnaire are shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Participants’ Choices in Experiment 1 According to Framing Group
Decision Positive framing group Negative framing group
Plan A (low risk) 44 (37%) 38 (33%)
Plan B (high risk) 75 (63%) 77 (67%)
Total 119 (100%) 115 (100%)
1 The “Asian disease” problem is a widely used classical scenario phrased as follows: Problem 1: 
Imagine that the US is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which is expected 
to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been proposed. Assume 
that the exact scientific estimate of the consequences of the programs is as follows: If Program 
A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. If Program B is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that 600 
people will be saved and 2/3 probability that no people will be saved. Which of the two programs 
would you favor?
 Problem 2: If Program C is adopted, 400 people will die. If Program D is adopted, there is 1/3 
probability that nobody will die and 2/3 probability that 600 people will die. Which of the two 
programs would you favor?
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We found that more than half of the participants chose Plan B, and fewer chose 
Plan A, regardless of the framing conditions. 
A chi-square test revealed that under the condition of a positive framing effect, 
there was a significant difference between the number of participants who chose 
Plan A or B (2 = 8.076, df = 1, p = .004), with more participants tending to make 
a riskier choice. Under the condition of a negative framing effect, there was also 
a significant difference between the number of participants who chose Plan A 
or B (2 = 13.226, df = 1, p < .001), with more participants tending to make a 
riskier choice. However there was no significant difference in choices between 
the positive and negative framing groups (2 = 0.397, df = 1, p = .529). 
Our results in this experiment show no framing effect. Both groups of 
participants made riskier choices but no preference shift was found. These 
results are consistent with those obtained by previous researchers, who found no 
framing effect among Chinese participants. Because we allowed the participants 
sufficient time to think about and complete the questionnaire, other potential 
factors may have been involved in the decision-making process, which may have 
reduced decision bias. 
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 was conducted using a programmed computer procedure to 
enforce temporal control and reduce the influence of other potential factors. 
Method
Participants and Procedure. Participants were 177 Chinese college students 
recruited from a university in Beijing, China. Of these participants, 86 were 
assigned to the positive framing group (41 males, 42 females), and 91 were 
assigned to the negative framing group (46 males, 45 females).
The Asian disease problem was presented on the screen of a computer in the 
laboratory. Participants completed the experiment one at a time, taking turns 
to use the same computer. They were asked to make their decisions as soon as 
possible, by clicking the mouse on either option “A” or option “B”. Participants’ 
choices and decision-making times were recorded by the computer. Participants 
were given several practice trials before completing the formal test. 
Results
The results of Experiment 2 are shown in Table 2. 
A chi-square test showed that, for the positive framing group, there was no 
significant difference between the number of participants who chose Plan A 
(60%) or B (40%; 2 = 3.767, df = 1, p = .052), indicating that participants had 
no tendency to avoid risk under the condition of a positive framing effect. 
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Table 2. Participants Choices in Experiment 2 According to Framing Group
Decision Positive framing group Negative framing group
Plan A (low risk) 52  (60%) 22  (24%)
Plan B (high risk) 34  (40%) 69  (76%)
Total 86  (100%) 91  (100%)
For the negative framing group, there was a significant difference between 
the number of participants who chose Plan A (24%) or B (76%; 2 = 24.275, 
df = 1, p < .001), indicating that participants were prone to make risky decisions 
under negative framing conditions. Choices for the positive and negative framing 
groups were significantly different (2 = 23.933, df = 1, p < .001). Our results in 
this experiment suggest that when participants had to make immediate choices 
without having time to undertake thorough consideration, they showed an altered 
risk preference and the framing effect was significant. 
Table 3 shows a further comparison between decision times for the two 
groups. A t test showed that there was a significant difference in decision times 
between the positive and negative framing groups (t = -3.460, df = 175, p < .001). 
Participants in the positive framing group had significantly shorter decision times 
than did participants in the negative framing group. This finding implies that 
there are factors other than framing that influence individuals’ decision making, 
leading to differences in information processing. 
Table 3. Decision time (in seconds) of positive and negative framing groups
 Group n M SD SE
Decision time Positive framing group 86 7.308 3.1944 .445
 Negative framing group 91 9.062 3.5277 .3698
General Discussion
The Experiment 1 results differ from those obtained in many studies conducted 
with Western participants, but they are consistent with studies conducted with 
Chinese participants (Li, 2003; Wang, 1996; Wang et al., 2001; Zhang & Miao, 
2008). Cultural factors, such as those identified by Hofstede and Bond (1984) in 
their study of cross-cultural dimensions, may lead Chinese individuals to be more 
prone to taking risks. Hsee and Weber (1999) found that Chinese individuals are 
significantly more likely to seek risks when compared with American individuals. 
They explained this finding in terms of a cushion hypothesis, suggesting that 
people in a collectivist society, such as China, are more likely to receive help if 
they are in need (i.e., they will be cushioned if they fall) and, consequently, are 
less risk averse than people in an individualistic society such as the USA. 
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However, when requested to make a decision quickly, Chinese participants 
tended to behave like Western participants (i.e., a framing effect occurred). 
Therefore, in conditions that allow for thorough thinking and analysis, a 
cushion effect may exist, and other potential factors, such as individual and 
cultural differences, may also influence decision making. This might explain the 
variations among study results in framing effects on individuals’ decision-making 
patterns. That is, when allowed limited time to think, an intuitive thinking style 
may result in an irrational choice, leading to the occurrence of the framing effect. 
The Experiment 2 results also show that participants under the condition of a 
positive framing effect make quicker decisions, whereas participants under the 
condition of a negative framing effect make slower decisions. This shows that 
different framing conditions influence information processing, which is reflected 
by reaction times. Therefore, individuals under different framing conditions 
seem to use different cognitive systems. According to the dual-systems model 
theory (Gilovich et al., 2002; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Stanovich & 
West, 2000) and Dunegan’s (1993) point of view, the riskier decisions made 
by participants under the condition of a positive framing effect in Experiment 
2 may be attributed to the use of an intuitive, heuristic reasoning system with a 
fast information processing speed. By contrast, under the condition of a negative 
framing effect, participants may exhibit features of an analytic system with slow 
information processing speed. 
One of the limitations in this study is that we made inferences about cognitive 
mechanisms and potential factors that may have influenced the decision-making 
process. Therefore, clear experimental evidence is warranted in future studies.
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